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Abstract
Differential privacy (DP) is a compelling privacy definition that explains the privacy-
utility tradeoff via formal, provable guarantees. Inspired by recent progress toward
general-purpose data release algorithms, we propose a private sketch, or small
summary of the dataset, that supports a multitude of machine learning tasks in-
cluding regression, classification, density estimation, near-neighbor search, and
more. Our sketch consists of randomized contingency tables that are indexed with
locality-sensitive hashing and constructed with an efficient one-pass algorithm.
We prove competitive error bounds for DP kernel density estimation. Existing
methods for DP kernel density estimation scale poorly, often exponentially slower
with an increase in dimensions. In contrast, our sketch can quickly run on large,
high-dimensional datasets in a single pass. Exhaustive experiments show that our
generic sketch delivers a similar privacy-utility tradeoff when compared to existing
DP methods at a fraction of the computation cost. We expect that our sketch will
enable differential privacy in distributed, large-scale machine learning settings.
1 Introduction
Large-scale data collection is an integral component of the modern machine learning pipeline. The
success of a learning algorithm critically depends on the quantity and quality of the input data.
Although vast amounts of data are available, the information is often of a personal or sensitive
nature. Models can leak substantial information about individual participants, even if we only release
predictions or outputs [14, 13, 22]. Privacy is, therefore, an important design factor for machine
learning algorithms.
To protect against diverse and sophisticated attacks, -differential privacy has emerged as a the-
oretically rigorous definition of privacy with robust guarantees [10]. Informally, an algorithm is
differentially private if the inclusion (or exclusion) of any specific data record cannot substantially
alter the output. In this paper, we consider the task of privately releasing a function fD(q)→ R that
applies a pairwise operation k(x, q) to each record {x1, ...xN} in a dataset D and returns the sum.
Although one could directly evaluate fD(q) and release the result with the exponential mechanism,
we can only evaluate fD a finite number of times before the privacy budget runs out. The function
release problem is to release a private summary SD of fD that can answer an unlimited number
of queries [16]. We also seek error bounds for all queries1, not just the global minimum as with
empirical risk minimization [5] or a finite set of linear queries as in [17].
Many machine learning problems can be solved in the function release framework. When k(x, q) is a
loss function, we can train a model by minimizing fD. When k(x, q) is a kernel function, fD is the
1By “all queries”, we mean all values of q. There is no polynomial algorithm for all general queries [25].
Preprint. Under review.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
09
35
2v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
6 J
un
 20
20
kernel density estimate - a convenient way to approximate the likelihood function in a classification
model. As a result, function release has received considerable theoretical attention. There are elegant,
general and powerful techniques to release essentially any function [16, 1, 21, 27]. However, function
release has not yet been widely adopted in practice because existing methods fail to scale beyond
small, low-dimensional datasets. The practical utility of function release is plagued by issues such as
quadratic runtime and exponential memory requirements. For instance, many algorithms release fD
via function approximation over an interpolation lattice, but the size of the lattice grows exponentially
with dimensions.
Our Contribution: In this work, we propose a scalable approach to function release using the
RACE sketch, a recent development in (non-private) data streaming algorithms. The RACE sketch
can approximate pairwise kernel sums on streaming data for a specific class of kernels known as
locality sensitive hash (LSH) kernels. By restricting our attention to LSH kernel sums, we obtain fast
streaming algorithms for private function release. RACE sketches consist of a small array of integers
(∼4 MB) and are well-suited to large-scale distributed settings. Private sketches are sought after by
practitioners because they combine algorithmic efficiency with privacy guarantees [24]. We show
how to construct a private RACE sketch SD for the LSH kernel sum fD. We prove that our sketch is
-differentially private and derive pointwise error bounds for our approximation to fD. Our bounds
are competitive with existing methods but come at a smaller computation cost. RACE easily scales to
datasets with hundreds of dimensions and millions of entries.
Although the restriction to LSH kernels might seem limiting, we argue that most machine learning
tasks can be performed using the RACE sketch. We show how to express classification, linear
regression, kernel density estimation (KDE), anomaly detection and mode finding in terms of specific
LSH kernel compositions. We conduct an exhaustive set of experiments with KDE, classification and
linear regression. Our experiments show that RACE can release useful functions for many machine
learning tasks with a competitive privacy-utility tradeoff.
2 Background
We consider a dataset D of N points in Rd. Although our analysis naturally extends to any metric
space, we restrict our attention to Rd for the sake of presentation.
2.1 Differential Privacy
We use the well-established definition of differential privacy [10].
Definition 1. Differential Privacy [10] A randomized functionA is said to provide (, β)-differential
privacy if for all neighboring databases D and D′ (which differ in at most one element) and all
subsets S in the codomain of A,
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[A(D′) ∈ S] + β
The parameter  is the privacy budget. The privacy budget limits the amount of information thatA(D)
can leak about any individual element of D. If β > 0, then A(D) might leak more information, but
only with probability up to β. In this paper, we consider β = 0, which is simply called “-differential
privacy.” The Laplace mechanism [10] is a general method to satisfy -differential privacy. By adding
zero-mean Laplace noise to a real-valued function, we obtain differential privacy if the noise is scaled
based on the sensitivity of the function (Definition 2).
Definition 2. Sensitivity [10] For a function A : D → Rd, the L1-sensitivity of A is
∆ = sup ||A(D)−A(D′)||1
where the supremum is taken over all neighboring datasets D and D′
Theorem 1. Laplace Mechanism [10] LetA : D → Rd be a non-private function with sensitivity ∆
and let z ∼ Lap(∆/)d (d-dimensional i.i.d Laplace vector). Then the function A(D) + z provides
-differential privacy.
2.2 Related Work
There are several techniques to release the kernel sum fD with differential privacy. A common
approach is to decompose fD into a set of weighted basis functions [28]. We truncate the basis
2
Method Error Bound Runtime Comments
Bernstein
polynomials [1] d
d
d+H
(
1
 log
1
δ
) H
d+H O(dNMd)
M ≥ 2. Memory is also
exponential in d.
PFDA [21] 2

√
log 2β log
1
δ
C
φ O(dN
2)
C and φ are task-dependent
(, β)-differential privacy
MWEM [17] N
2
3
(
logN log |Q|

)1/3
O(dN |Q|) Q is a set of query points. Holdswith probability 1− 1/poly(|Q|)
Trigonometric
polynomials [27]
1
N
2d
2d+H O(dN1+
d
2d+H )
The result holds with probability
1− δ for δ ≥ 10e− 15Nd/2d+K
This work
(
N
 log
1
δ
) 1
2 O(dN)
Applies only for LSH kernels.
Efficient streaming algorithm.
Table 1: Summary of related methods to release the kernel sum fD =
∑
D k(x,q) for an N point
dataset D in Rd. Unless otherwise stated, the error is attained with probability 1− δ and -differential
privacy. We hide constant factors and adjust results to estimate fD rather than the KDE (N−1fD(q))
when necessary. H is a kernel smoothness parameter.
expansion to m terms and represent fD as a set of weights in Rm. The weights are made private
via the Laplace mechanism and used to release a private version of fD. Each basis term in the
representation increases the quality of the approximation but degrades the quality of the weights,
since the privacy budget  is shared among the m weights. This is a bias-variance tradeoff: we trade
variance in the form of Laplace noise with bias in the form of truncation error. The Fourier basis [16],
Bernstein basis [1], trigonometric polynomial basis [27] and various kernel bases have all been used
for private function release. Such methods are most effective when fD is a smooth function.
An alternative set of techniques rely on functional data analysis [21] or synthetic databases [17, 4].
In [21], the authors use densities over function spaces to release a smoothed approximation to fD.
The main idea of [17] and [4] is to release a set of weighted synthetic points that can be used to
estimate fD. Table 1 compares these methods based on approximation error and computation.
2.3 Locality-Sensitive Hashing
LSH Functions: An LSH family F is a family of functions l(x) : Rd → Z with the following
property: Under l(x), similar points have a high probability of having the same hash value. We say
that a collision occurs whenever two points have the same hash code, i.e. l(x) = l(y). In this paper,
we use a slightly different definition than the original [18] because we require the collision probability
at all points.
Definition 3. We say that a hash family F is locality-sensitive with collision probability k(·, ·) if
for any two points x and y in Rd, l(x) = l(y) with probability k(x,y) under a uniform random
selection of l(·) from F .
LSH Kernels: When the collision probability k(x,y) is a monotone decreasing function of the
distance metric dist(x,y), one can show that k is a positive semidefinite kernel function [8]. We
say that a kernel function k(x,y) is an LSH kernel if it forms the collision probability for an LSH
family. For a kernel to be an LSH kernel, it must obey the conditions described in [6]. A number of
well-known LSH families induce useful kernels [15]. For example, there are LSH kernels that closely
resemble the cosine, Laplace and multivariate Student kernels [8].
2.4 RACE Sketch
LSH kernels are interesting because there are efficient algorithms to estimate the quantity
fD(q) =
∑
x∈D
k(x,q) (1)
when k(x,q) is an LSH kernel. In [8], the authors present a one-pass streaming algorithm to estimate
fD. The algorithm produces a RACE (Repeated Array of Count Estimators) sketch SD ∈ ZR×W ,
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a 2D array of integers that we index using LSH functions. This array is sufficient to report fD(q)
for any query q ∈ Rd. We begin by constructing R functions {l1(x), ...lR(x)} from an LSH family
F with the desired collision probability. When an element x arrives from the stream, we hash x to
get R hash values, one for each row of SD. We increment row i at location li(x) and repeat for all
elements in the dataset. To approximate fD(q), we return the mean of SD[r, lr(q)] over the R rows.
RACE for Density Estimation: This streaming algorithm approximates the kernel density estimate
(KDE) for all possible queries in a single pass. RACE is also a mergable summary with an efficient
distributed implementation. In practice, RACE estimates the KDE with 1% error using a 4 MB array,
even for large high-dimensional datasets. To prove rigorous error bounds, observe that each row of
SD is an unbiased estimator of fD. The main theoretical result of [8] is stated below as Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Unbiased RACE Estimator[8] Suppose that X is the query result for one of the rows
of SD. That is, X = SD[r, lr(q)]
E[X] = fD(q) var(X) ≤
(
f˜D(q)
)2
=
(∑
x∈D
√
k(x,q)
)2
RACE for Empirical Risk Minimization: Theorem 2 holds for all collision probabilities, even
those that are neither continuous nor positive semidefinite. Thus, we can use RACE to approximate
the empirical risk for a variety of losses. Suppose we are given a dataset D = {z1...zN} of training
examples and a loss function L(θ, z), where θ is a parameter that describes the model. Empirical Risk
Minimization (ERM) consists of finding a parameter θ (and thus a model) that minimizes the mean
loss over the training set. RACE can approximate the empirical risk when L(θ, z) can be expressed in
terms of LSH collision probabilities. Although we cannot analytically find the gradient of the RACE
count values, derivative-free optimization [9] is highly effective for RACE sketches. With the right
LSH family, RACE can perform many machine learning tasks in the one-pass streaming setting.
3 Private Sketches with RACE
We propose a private version of the RACE sketch. We obtain -differential privacy by applying the
Laplace mechanism to each count in the RACE sketch array. Algorithm 1 introduces a differentially
private method to release the RACE sketch, illustrated in Figure 1. It is straightforward to see that
Algorithm 1 only requires O(NR) hash computations. Assuming fixed R, we have O(dN) runtime.
Algorithm 1 Private RACE sketch
Input: Dataset D, privacy budget , LSH
family F , dimensions R×W
Output: Private sketch SD ∈ ZR×W
Initialize: R independent LSH functions
{l1, ..., lR} from the LSH family F
SD ← 0R×W
for x ∈ D do
for r in 1 to R do
Increment SD[r, lr(x)]
end for
end for
SD = bSD + Zc where Z iid∼ Lap(R−1)
Algorithm 2 RACE query
Input: Sketch SD, query q, the same R
LSH functions from Algorithm 1
Output: Estimate of N−1fD(q)
N̂ ← R−1∑i,j SD[i, j]
fˆD ← 0
for r in 1 to R do
fˆD = fˆD + 1RSD[r, lr(q)]
end for
Return: fˆD/N̂
3.1 Privacy
For the purposes of Definition 1, we consider the function A : D → RR×W to be Algorithm 1. The
codomain of A is the set of all RACE sketches with R rows and W columns. Our main theorem is
that the value returned by A(D) is -differentially private. That is, our sketch is differentially private.
We begin the proof by applying the parallel composition theorem [11] to the counters in one row,
which each see a disjoint partition of D. Then, we apply the sequential composition theorem [11] to
the set of R rows. Due to space limitations, we defer the full proof to the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Algorithm 1 for SD ∈ Z3×6. We hash each element in the stream with
LSH functions {l1, l2, l3} ∈ F having collision probability k(x,y). In this example, l1(xi) = 3,
l2(xi) = 2 and l3(xi) = 6. We increment the highlighted cells. The addition of the Laplace noise is
not shown in the figure, but is done by perturbing each count in SD.
Theorem 3. For any R > 0, W > 0, and LSH family F , the output of Algorithm 1, or the RACE
sketch SD, is -differentially private.
3.2 Utility
Since one can construct many learning algorithms from a sufficiently good estimate of fD [1], we
focus on utility guarantees for the RACE estimate of fD(q). Since RACE is a collection of unbiased
estimators for fD(q), our proof strategy is to bound the distance between the RACE estimate and
the mean. To bound the variance of the private RACE estimator, we add the independent Laplace
noise variance 2R2−2 to the bound from Theorem 2. Theorem 4 follows using the median-of-means
procedure.
Theorem 4. Let fˆD(q) be the median-of-means estimate using an -differentially private RACE
sketch with R rows and f˜D(q) =
∑
D
√
k(x,q). Then with probability 1− δ,
|fˆD(q)− fD(q)| ≤
(
f˜2D(q)
R
+
2
2
R
)1/2√
32 log 1/δ
Theorem 4 suggests a tradeoff for which there is an optimal value of R. If we increase the number of
rows R in the sketch, we improve the estimator but must add more Laplace noise. To get our main
utility guarantee, we choose an optimal R that minimizes the error bound.
Corollary 1. Put R = d 1√
2
f˜D(q)e. Then the approximation error bound is
|fˆD(q)− fD(q)| ≤ 16
(
f˜D(q)

log 1/δ
)1/2
≤ 16
√
N

log 1/δ
If we divide both sides of Corollary 1 by fD, we bound the relative (or percent) error rather than the
absolute error. Corollary 1 suggests that it is hardest to achieve a small relative error when fD is small.
This agrees with our intuition about how the KDE should behave under differential privacy guarantees.
Fewer individuals make heavy contributions to fD in low-density regions than in high-density ones,
so the effect of the noise is worse.
4 Applications
Because RACE can release LSH kernel sums, our sketch is broadly useful for many algorithms in
machine learning. In particular, we discuss private density estimation, classification, regression, mode
finding, anomaly detection and diversity sampling using RACE.
Kernel Density Estimation: To use RACE for KDE, we select one or more LSH kernels and
construct sketches with Algorithm 1. We require one RACE sketch for each kernel and bandwidth
setting, and we return the result of Algorithm 2. Note that the query no longer has access to N , the
number of elements in the private dataset. Therefore, we estimate N directly from the private sketch.
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Dataset N d σ Description Task
NYC 25k 1 5k NYC salaries (2018)
KDE
SF 29k 1 5k SF salaries (2018)
skin 241k 3 5.0 RGB skin tones
codrna 57k 8 0.5 RNA genomic data
nomao 34k 26 0.6 User location data
Classificationoccupancy 17k 5 0.5 Building occupancy
pulsar 17k 8 0.1 Pulsar star data
airfoil 1.4k 9 - Airfoil parameters and sound level
Regressionnaval 11k 16 - Frigate turbine propulsion
gas 3.6k 128 - Gas sensor, different concentrations
Table 2: Datasets used for KDE and classification experiments. Each dataset has N entries with d
features. σ is the kernel bandwidth.
PFDA Bernstein KME RACE
Preprocess > 3 days 2.3 days 6 hr 13 min
Query - 6.2 ms 1.2 ms 0.4 ms
Table 3: Computation time for KDE on the skin dataset. Note that we were unable to run PFDA on
this dataset. Instead, we report the PFDA runtime for the (smaller) NYC dataset.
Mode Finding: One can apply gradient-free optimization to KDE to recover the modes of the data
distribution. This works surprisingly well, but in general the KDE is a non-convex function. One can
also apply linear programming techniques that use information about the hash function partitions to
identify a point in a partition with the highest count values.
Naive Bayes Classification: Using kernel density classification, a well-developed result from sta-
tistical hypothesis testing [19], we can construct classifiers with RACE under both the maximum-
likelihood and maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision rules. Suppose we are given a training set D
with M classes C1, ...CM and a query q. We can represent the empirical likelihood Pr[q|Ci,D] with
a sketch of the KDE for class i. Algorithm 2 returns an estimate of this probability, which may be
used directly by a naive Bayes classifier or other type of probabilistic learner.
Anomaly Detection / Sampling: Anomaly detection can be cast as a KDE classification problem. If
Algorithm 2 reports a low density for q, then the training set contains few elements similar to q and
thus q is an outlier. This principle is behind the algorithms in [20] and [7].
Linear Regression: If we use an asymmetric LSH family [23], we can construct a valid surrogate
loss for the linear regression loss (〈[x, y], [θ,−1]〉)2. The key insight is that the signed random
projection (SRP) LSH kernel is monotone in the inner product. If we apply SRP to both [x, y] and
−[x, y], we obtain an LSH kernel with two components. One component is monotone increasing
with the inner product, while the other is monotone decreasing. The resulting surrogate loss is a
monotone function of the L2 loss and a convex function of θ.
5 Experiments
We perform an exhaustive comparison for KDE, classification and regression. For KDE, we estimate
the density of the salaries for New York City (NYC) and San Francisco (SF) city employees in
2018, as well as the high-dimensional densities for the skin and codrna UCI datasets. We use the
same LSH kernel as the authors of [8]. We use UCI datasets for the regression and classification
experiments. Most private KDE methods require the data to lie in the unit sphere or cube; we scale
the inputs accordingly. Table 2 presents the datasets used in our experiments. We make the following
considerations for our baseline methods.
KDE: We implemented several function release methods from Table 1. We also compare against
the Fourier basis estimator [16, 28] and the kernel mean embedding (KME) method [4]. We use the
Python code released by [4] and implemented the other methods in Python. To give a fair comparison,
we profiled and optimized each of our baselines. We were unable to run Fourier and PFDA in more
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Figure 2: Privacy-utility tradeoff for private function release methods. We report the L2 function
error and the mean relative error for 2000 held-out queries.
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Figure 3: Binary classification experiments. We show the privacy-utility tradeoff for a private logistic
regression classifier and the RACE max-likelihood classifier. Average over 10 repetitions.
than one dimension because they both require function evaluations on a Bravais lattice, which scales
exponentially. We show the density estimates and their errors in Figure 2.
Classification: We compare a maximum-likelihood RACE classifier against a regularized logistic
regression classifier trained using objective perturbation [5]. We average over the Laplace noise and
report the accuracy on a held-out test set in Figure 3.
Regression: We compare RACE regression against five algorithms: sufficient statistics perturbation
(SSP), objective perturbation (ObjPert), posterior sampling (OPS), and adaptive versions of SSP and
OPS (AdaSSP and AdaOPS [26]). We use the MatLab code released by [26] and report the mean
squared error (MSE) on a held-out test set in Figure 4.
Computation: Table 3 displays the computation time needed to construct a useful function release.
Note that Bernstein release can run faster if we use fewer interpolation points (see Table 1), but we
still required at least 12 hours of computation for competitive results. The Bernstein mechanism
requires many binomial coefficient evaluations, which were expensive even when we used optimized
C code. KME requires a large-scale kernel matrix computation, and PFDA required several days for
an expensive eigenvalue computation. RACE construction time varies based on R, but is substantially
faster than all baselines.
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Figure 4: Linear regression experiments. We show the privacy-utility tradeoff for RACE and several
other linear regression methods. Average over 10 repetitions.
6 Discussion
Function Release at Scale: RACE is ideal for private function release in large-scale distributed
applications. Although PFDA and the Bernstein mechanism have the strongest error bounds, they
required days to produce the experimental results in Figure 2. This is a serious barrier in practice - it
would require > 2128 ≈ 1038 computations to run the Bernstein mechanism on the UCI gas dataset.
The RACE sketch has a small memory footprint, inexpensive streaming updates and can quickly run
on high-dimensional datasets. We believe that RACE can make differentially private function release
a viable tool for real-world applications.
Our sketch is also convenient to use and deploy in a production environment because it is relatively
insensitive to hyperparameters. In general, we found that density estimation requires a larger sketch
with more rows R than classification or regression. Classification and regression problems benefit
from a smaller hash range W than function release. Higher dimensional problems also require a
larger hash range. However, these choices are not critical and any R ∈ [100, 1k] with W ∈ [100, 1k]
will provide good results. Hyperparameter tuning can be accomplished using very little of the overall
privacy budget.
Privacy and Utility: Our sketch beats interpolation-based methods for private function release
when the dataset has more than a few dimensions and when fD is not smooth. Depending on
smoothness, our
√
N−1 error rate improves upon the rates of [27] and [17] for LSH kernels. In our
experiments (Figure 2), the Bernstein mechanism outperforms RACE on the SF dataset but fails to
capture the nuances of the NYC salary distribution, which has sharp peaks. RACE preserves the
details of fD because the Laplace noise can only make local changes to the RACE structure. Suppose
we generate a Laplace noise that is unusually large for one particular RACE counter. Queries that do
not involve the problematic counter are unaffected. If we perturb one or two of the most important
weights of a series estimator, the changes propagate to all queries.
Although RACE can only estimate LSH kernels, the space of LSH kernels is sufficiently large that we
can release many useful functions. Our RACE surrogate loss outperformed objective perturbation [5]
and compared favorably to other linear regression baselines. RACE also performed well in our
classification experiments for  > 10−1, providing a competitive utility tradeoff for practical privacy
budgets. Our experiments show that RACE can privately release useful functions for many machine
learning problems.
7 Conclusion
We have presented RACE, a differentially private sketch that can be used for a variety of machine
learning tasks. RACE is competitive with the state of the art on tasks including density estimation,
classification, and linear regression. RACE sketches can be constructed in the one-pass streaming
setting and are highly computationally efficient. At the same time, our sketch offers good performance
on many machine learning tasks and is reasonably efficient in terms of the privacy budget. Given the
utility, simplicity and speed of the algorithm, we expect that RACE will enable differentially private
machine learning in large-scale settings.
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Broader Impact
Privacy is a serious concern in machine learning and a barrier to the widespread adoption of useful
technology. For example, machine learning models can substantially improve medical treatments,
inform social policy, and help with financial decision-making. While such applications are overall
beneficial to society, they often rely on sensitive personal data that users may not want to disclose.
For instance, a 2019 survey found that a large majority (∼ 80%) of Americans are concerned with
but do not understand how technology companies use the data they collect [3]. Data management
practices have recently come under increased scrutiny, especially after the enactment of the European
GDPR Act in 2018. To improve public confidence in their services, Google [12] and Apple [24] both
advertise differential privacy as a central part of their data collection process.
Differential privacy provides strong protection against malicious data use but is difficult to apply in
practice. This is particularly true for functional data release, which is often prohibitively expensive
in terms of computation cost. Our work substantially reduces the computational cost of this useful
technique to achieve differential privacy. By reducing the computational requirement, we make
privacy more accessible and attainable for data publishers, since large computing infrastructure is
no longer needed to release private information. This directly reduces the economic cost of data
privacy, an important consideration for governments and private companies. Our sketching method
also allows private functional release to be applied to more real-world datasets, making it easier to
release high-dimensional information with differential privacy.
Appendix
This section contains proofs and detailed discussion of the theorems.
Privacy
We consider a function A : D → RR×W that takes in a dataset and outputs an R×W RACE sketch.
A is a randomized function, where the randomness is over the choice of the LSH functions and the
(independent) Laplace noise. In this context, the -differentially private query is the RACE sketch
SD. Our main theorem is that the sketch is -differentially private. Because differential privacy is
robust to post-processing, we can then query SD as many times as desired once the sketch is released.
Proof Sketch: The sketch SD consists of R independent rows. Each row consists of W count
values. First, we prove privately release one of the rows by adding Laplace noise with variance −1
(i.e. sensitivity ∆ = 1). This is described in Lemma 1. Then, we apply Lemma 1 with /R to release
all the rows, proving the main theorem.
Lemma 1. Consider one row of the RACE sketch, and add independent Laplace noise Lap(1/) to
each counter. The row can be released with -differential privacy.
Proof. Consider just one of the W counters. It is easy to see that the sensitivity of the counter is 1
because changing a single element from the dataset can only create a change of ±1 in the counter. By
the Laplace mechanism, this counter can be released with -differential privacy by adding Laplace
noise Lap(1/).
The row contains W counters, and we can release each one with the Laplace mechanism. Therefore,
we have W mechanisms M1, ...MW (one to release each counter) which are independently -
differentially private. The parallel composition theorem [11] states that if each mechanism is
computed on a disjoint subset of the dataset, then we can compute all of the mechanisms (i.e. release
all of the counters) with -differential privacy.
This is indeed the case for the RACE sketch. Under the LSH function, each element in the dataset
maps to exactly one of the W counters. Thus, the W counters are computed on disjoint subsets of the
dataset and we can release them with -differential privacy.
Theorem 3. For any R > 0, W > 0, and LSH family F , the output of Algorithm 1, or the RACE
sketch SD, is -differentially private.
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Proof. The sketch is composed of R independent rows. Consider the mechanism from Lemma 1 to
release a single row with -differential privacy. The sequential composition theorem [11] states that
given R mechanismsM1, ...MR (one to release each row) which are independently -differentially
private, we can compute all the mechanisms (i.e. release all rows) with R-differential privacy.
To construct the sketch, we apply Lemma 1 to each row with /R differential privacy by adding
independent Laplace noise Lap(R/) to each counter. The sequential composition theorem guarantees
that we can release all R rows with -differential privacy.
Utility
First, we introduce the median-of-means trick in Lemma 2. The median-of-means procedure is a
standard analysis technique with many applications in the streaming literature. Lemma 2 is a special
case of Theorem 2.1 from [2].
Lemma 2. Let X1, ...XR be R i.i.d. random variables with mean E[X] = µ and variance ≤ σ2. To
get the median of means estimate µˆ, break the R random variables into k groups with m = R/k
elements in each group.
µˆ = median
 m∑
i=1
Xi, ...,
km∑
i=(k−1)m+1
Xi

Put k = 8 log(1/δ) and m = R/k2. Then with probability at least 1− δ, the deviation of the estimate
µˆ from the mean µ is
|µˆ− µ| ≤
√
32σ2
log(1/δ)
R
Each row r of the sketch provides an estimator Xr to be used in the median-of-means technique. By
adding the Laplace noise variance, we can find σ2 in Lemma 2 and provide performance guarantees.
Theorem 4. Let fˆD(q) be the median-of-means estimate using an -differentially private RACE
sketch with R rows and f˜D(q) =
∑
D
√
k(x,q). Then with probability 1− δ,
|fˆD(q)− fD(q)| ≤
(
f˜2D(q)
R
+
2
2
R
)1/2√
32 log 1/δ
Proof. To use median-of-means, we must bound the variance of the RACE estimate Xr =
SD[r, lr(q)] after we add the Laplace noise. Since the Laplace noise is independent of the LSH
functions, we simply add the Laplace noise variance 2R2−2 to the variance bound in Theorem 2.
var(Xr) ≤ σ2 =
(
f˜D
)2
+ 2
R2
2
Using this variance bound with Lemma 2 we have the following statement with probability 1− δ.
|fˆD(q)− fD(q)| ≤
(
f˜2D(q)
R
+
2
2
R
)1/2√
32 log 1/δ
Corollary 1. Put R = d 1√
2
f˜D(q)e. Then the approximation error bound is
|fˆD(q)− fD(q)| ≤ 16
(
f˜D(q)

log 1/δ
)1/2
≤ 16
√
N

log 1/δ
2For simplicity, we suppose k and m are integers that evenly divide R. See [2] for the complete analysis.
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Proof. Take the derivative of
√
a/R+ bR with respect to R to find that R =
√
a/b minimizes the
bound. Put a = f˜2D(q) and b = 2/
2. The corollary is obtained by substituting R = 1√
2
f˜D(q) into
Theorem 4. We may replace f˜D(q) with N in the inequality because
f˜D(q) =
∑
x∈D
√
k(x,q ≤
∑
x∈D
1 = N
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